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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 09-3494 
 ___________ 
 
ALTON D. BROWN, 
Appellant 
 
v. 
 
DAVID DIGUGLIELMO; SCOTT WILLIAMSON; FELIPE ARIAS; 
WILLIAM BANTA; LIEUTENANT WHITE; LIEUTENANT JUDGE; 
LIEUTENANT GIVEN; SERGEANT ZIMMERMAN; SGT. NAFUS; 
SGT. COX; AND TWENTY-NINE JOHN AND JANE DOES 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil Action No. 07-cv-03771 ) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Anita B. Brody 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
February 24, 2011 
 Before:  BARRY, JORDAN and GARTH, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed  March 21, 2011 ) 
 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION 
 ___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Appellant Alton Brown, a Pennsylvania state prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals 
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from the order of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
dismissing his civil rights complaint.  For the reasons that follow, we will vacate the 
judgment of the District Court in part, affirm in part, and remand for further proceedings. 
 The facts underlying the instant appeal are well-known to the parties, and thus are 
only briefly set forth here.  In September 2007, Brown commenced an action under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 against various employees of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections 
(hereafter referred to as the “DOC Defendants”) who worked at the State Correctional 
Institution at Graterford, as well as the institution‟s physician, Felipe Arias, M.D.  In an 
amended complaint filed in October 2008, Brown alleged that prison officials and Dr. 
Arias had been subjecting him to second-hand environmental tobacco smoke (“ETS”) in 
violation of his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
The DOC Defendants responded to Brown‟s complaint by filing a motion to 
dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment.  The DOC Defendants argued that 
Brown had failed to exhaust available administrative remedies, and had failed to allege 
sufficient personal involvement on the part of each of the DOC Defendants with respect 
to the ETS-related events.  In a two-sentence order entered on March 19, 2009, the 
District Court granted the DOC Defendants‟ motion.  The case proceeded against Dr. 
Arias, who likewise filed a motion to dismiss or, alternatively, for summary judgment.  
After considering Brown‟s opposition to Dr. Arias‟ motion, the District Court entered an 
order on July 27, 2009, granting the motion.  In addressing the merits of Brown‟s 
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complaint, the District Court concluded that the evidence offered with respect to Dr. 
Arias‟ alleged actions in smoking in the Restricted Housing Unit (“RHU”) or permitting 
others to smoke in his presence was insufficient to allow a reasonable fact-finder to 
conclude that Brown suffered an unreasonable risk of future harm from ETS exposure.  
The District Court thus granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Arias, and denied 
Brown‟s request to stay summary judgment proceedings for continued discovery. 
Brown‟s opposition was also construed by the District Court as a request to 
reconsider its order granting the DOC Defendants‟ motion.  In support of that request, 
Brown argued that he never received the motion, and thus did not have an opportunity to 
file a response in opposition.  Citing E.D. Pa. Loc. Adm. R. 7.1 in support of its decision 
to grant the DOC Defendants‟ motion as uncontested, the District Court rejected Brown‟s 
excuse after observing that he had consistently received the defendants‟ pleadings since 
the action began.  Accordingly, the District Court denied Brown‟s request for 
reconsideration.  This timely appeal followed. 
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of the District 
Court‟s dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), as well as its grant of summary judgment, is 
plenary.  See Nationwide Life Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 579 F.3d 
304, 307 (3d Cir. 2009); Chambers v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. Bd. of Educ., 587 F.3d 176, 181 
(3d Cir. 2009).  We review a denial of a motion for reconsideration for abuse of 
discretion, while reviewing the District Court‟s underlying legal determinations de novo 
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and its factual determinations for clear error.  Max‟s Seafood Café v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 
669, 673 (3d Cir. 1999).  We likewise review a District Court‟s discovery order for abuse 
of discretion, and “will not disturb such an order absent a showing of actual and 
substantial prejudice.”  Anderson v. Wachovia Mortg. Corp., 621 F.3d 261, 281 (3d Cir. 
2010). 
Brown‟s initial contention on appeal is that the District Court erred in concluding 
that he had timely received a copy of the DOC Defendants‟ motion to dismiss or, 
alternatively, for summary judgment, and in granting that motion as uncontested.  The 
DOC Defendants, on the other hand, contend that the District Court‟s ruling was actually 
an implicit determination that summary judgment was warranted on the basis of Brown‟s 
failure to exhaust available administrative remedies.  We find the DOC Defendants‟ 
argument to be unsupportable on the record presented, and dispose of it with little 
discussion.  While the basis of the District Court‟s ruling is not set forth in its initial 
order, there can be little doubt as to the reasoning behind its decision granting the DOC 
Defendants‟ motion once its subsequent order is considered.  In denying Brown‟s request 
for reconsideration, the District Court explicitly noted that a local administrative rule 
permits “the motion to be granted as uncontested.”  See District Court Order entered 
7/27/09 at 2 n.2.  The District Court then clearly stated that it granted the defendants‟ 
motion “[b]ecause Brown never filed a response.”  Id. 
Brown‟s argument that the District Court should not have granted the DOC 
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Defendants‟ motion where he claims that he never received notice that the motion had 
been filed and had never specifically been directed to file a response is not without some 
merit, and the DOC Defendants recognize as much.  See DOC Defendants‟ Brief at 22 
n.18  (“To grant a motion for summary judgment, or a motion to dismiss, without any 
substantive analysis, purely because the non-moving party failed to respond is often 
(although not invariably) improper.” (citing Stackhouse v. Mazurkiewicz, 951 F.2d 29, 
30 (3d Cir. 1991)).  We made clear quite some time ago in Stackhouse our disfavor of 
dismissals under Rule 12(b)(6) for purposes of sanctioning a litigant.  We further held in 
Stackhouse that a Rule 12(b)(6) motion should not be granted without an analysis of the 
merits of the underlying complaint notwithstanding local rules regarding the granting of 
unopposed motions.  Id. 
While we observed that “some cases” could be dismissed as unopposed (e.g., if the 
party is represented by counsel or failed to comply with a court‟s order), id. at 30, such is 
not the case here.  Unlike issuance of the order on March 31, 2009, directing Brown to 
show cause as to why Dr. Arias‟ motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary 
judgment should not be granted, no such order was issued as a result of the DOC 
Defendants‟ motion.  In fact, the only order issued subsequent to the filing of the DOC 
Defendants‟ motion was the District Court‟s scheduling order on January 7, 2009.  That 
apparent form order made no reference of the DOC Defendants‟ pending motion, but 
simply noted that the deadline for dispositive motions was set for May 18, 2009.  
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Accordingly, given the absence of evidence that Brown's failure to respond was willful, 
we will vacate that portion of the District Court‟s judgment granting the DOC 
Defendants‟ motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment, and remand 
the matter to the District Court for further proceedings.  As discussed more fully below, 
however, our remand is of a limited nature. 
There are two varieties of ETS claims – present injury claims and future injury 
claims – and they are measured by different standards.  See Atkinson v. Taylor, 316 F.3d 
257, 273 (3d Cir. 2003) (Ambro, J., dissenting in part).  Despite the fact that the District 
Court construed Brown‟s complaint as asserting only a future injury claim, we think it 
clear that Brown attempted to assert both types of claims.  As noted, Brown alleges that 
he is continuously exposed to second-hand cigarette smoke from the prison staff in his 
cell block.  Brown states that although he quit smoking back in April 2000, he has begun 
to experience the same symptoms as he did when he smoked:  sinus congestion, 
headaches, tightness of the lungs, and difficulty breathing.  See Amended Complaint at 4 
¶ 22.  He also believes that his liver and heart diseases have been aggravated by exposure 
to ETS.  Id. at ¶ 23.  Brown further argues that because of the second-hand smoke in the 
RHU, he is “in imminent danger of contracting cancer, Bronchitis, or some other smoke-
related disease if relief is not provided immediately.”  Id. at ¶ 22.  Brown requested 
declaratory and injunctive relief, in addition to compensatory and punitive damages. 
While Brown raised both types of injury claims, our remand is limited to his claim 
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that the DOC Defendants have created an unreasonable risk of future harm from his 
continued ETS exposure.  With respect to his present injury claim, we find lacking 
sufficient allegations of deliberate indifference on the part of the DOC Defendants in 
regards to any serious medical need of which they were made aware.  See Atkinson, 316 
F.3d at 273  (A present injury claim is a standard condition-of-confinement claim 
governed by the principles the Supreme Court established in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 
97 (1976) and Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994), requiring a prisoner to “allege a 
sufficiently serious medical need (the objective component) and deliberate indifference 
by prison officials in response (the subjective component).”). 
When considering a motion to dismiss, a court must “accept all factual allegations 
as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine 
whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to 
relief.”  Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008).  However, to 
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint – even a pro se complaint – “must contain 
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to „state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 
face.‟” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, __ U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. 
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).  “A claim has facial plausibility when the 
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that 
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”  Id.  We find that Brown‟s general 
allegations of exposure to ETS and his resulting sensitivities, even construed liberally, are 
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plainly insufficient to state a present injury claim for ETS exposure against the DOC 
Defendants.  While Brown alleges that the DOC Defendants acted with deliberate 
indifference in exposing him to levels of ETS that pose an unreasonable risk of harm to 
his future health, see Amended Complaint at 3 ¶ 19, he simply makes no allegations that 
the DOC Defendants were deliberately indifferent to any serious medical need he was 
currently experiencing from ETS exposure.  Such a deficiency is fatal to his Eighth 
Amendment claim. 
We have, of course, “instructed that if a complaint is vulnerable to 12(b)(6) 
dismissal, a district court must permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment would 
be inequitable or futile.”  Phillips, 515 F.3d at 236.  Here, however, we believe that 
affording Brown the opportunity to file a second amended complaint would be futile.  
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court‟s dismissal of Brown‟s present injury 
claim against the DOC Defendants.  See Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 
(3d Cir.1999) (“We may affirm the district court on any basis supported by the record.”).  
On the other hand, and as noted previously, we find that Brown‟s allegations regarding a 
future injury claim due to ETS exposure are sufficient to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) 
dismissal.  Accordingly, this claim will be remanded to the District Court for further 
proceedings during which the District Court is free to consider, inter alia, the DOC 
Defendants‟ exhaustion of administrative remedies defense and the parties‟ discovery 
requests. 
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 Having carefully reviewed the parties‟ submissions and the record on appeal, we 
further conclude that Brown has failed to establish an Eighth Amendment present or 
future injury claim for ETS exposure against Dr. Arias.  In the absence of any evidence 
Brown specifically complained to Dr. Arias that he had an ETS-related illness amounting 
to a sufficiently serious medical need or that he had sought treatment on account of 
excessive ETS exposure, he failed to establish deliberate indifference on the part of Dr. 
Arias to any such medical need.  See Atkinson, 316 F.3d at 266.  Even Brown‟s sworn 
allegations, taken as a whole, do not describe conduct that rises to the level of deliberate 
indifference with respect to Brown‟s present injury ETS exposure claim.  See Farmer, 
511 U.S. at 835 (“[D]eliberate indifference describes a state of mind more blameworthy 
than negligence,” but “it is satisfied by something less than acts or omissions for the very 
purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result.”). 
Brown‟s future injury claim against Dr. Arias fares no better considering the 
limited nature of the allegations in his sworn affidavit, e.g., that he observed Dr. Arias 
“smoke tobacco at or near [his] RHU cell on at least fifty (50) occasions” over the course 
of a three year period, he observed other unidentified staff smoke in Dr. Arias‟ presence 
on “many occasions,” and that, as a medical doctor, Dr. Arias is aware of the adverse 
effects of second hand smoke.  Liability for a future injury case based on exposure to 
ETS requires proof of:  (1) exposure to unreasonably high levels of ETS contrary to 
contemporary standards of decency; and (2) deliberate indifference by the authorities to 
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the exposure to ETS.  See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993).  Aside from the 
fact that Brown presented no evidence with respect to the levels of ETS to which he is 
being exposed, we agree with the District Court that Brown failed to present evidence 
demonstrating that Dr. Arias was deliberately indifferent to any unreasonable health risks 
he faces in the RHU.  See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837 (To establish liability under the Eighth 
Amendment, the prison “official must both be aware of facts from which the inference 
could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the 
inference.”). 
We have fully considered Brown‟s remaining challenges and find them to be 
lacking in merit.  Accordingly, we dispose of them without further discussion.  The 
District Court‟s judgment is thus vacated in part and affirmed in part, and this matter is 
remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
1
   
                                                 
1
  While we will grant Brown‟s motion to file a separate reply brief, which we have 
considered in rendering our decision, we deny his motion for a court order requiring 
appellees to provide him with his case files. 
